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In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
PROVO CITY, a municipal corporation, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULA-
TION, PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, Hal S. Bennett, Chairman of the 
said Public Service Commission of Utah; 
Donald Hacking and W. R. McEntire, mem-
bers of said Public Service Commission of 
Utah, and Frank A. Yeamans, Secretary of 
said Public Service Commission of Utah, and 
THE DENVER & RIO GRANDE WEST-
ERN RAILROAD COMPANY, 
Defendants, 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
CASE 
No. 7416 
Ninth South Street in Provo City, Utah, is a street run-
ning east and . west from University Avenue to Highway 
No .. 91, at ·approximately 5th East Street. It is the only 
street south of 6th South Street in Provo City, and has for 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
2 
over seventy years been a public street, being constantly 
for that time used as such. The area east of the point 
where 9th South Street joins Highway No. 91 is densely 
populated, and the community is growing in that area. In 
the vicinity of the inter~ction of 5th East and 9th South 
Street, the tracks of the Denver and Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, along with those of other railroads, 
intersect 9th South Street. Approximately five hundred 
people are employed in the industrial area of Provo City 
located south of 9th South Street and west of 5th East 
Street, and a large portion of these employees live in the 
southeast residential portion of the city above Highway 
No. 91. These persons have always used 9th South Street 
as a means of going to and from work, and travel on that 
street has constantly increased. 
In the autumn of 1942 and the spring of 1943, negoti-
ations were conducted by the officials of the Denver and 
Rio Grande Western Railroad Company, hereinafter called 
the railroad company, and the city officials regarding the 
closing of 9th South Street at the point of intersection with 
the railroad company's right-of-way. These negotiations 
never culmina ted in an ordinance )effecting the closing of 
that street. Nevertheless, the railroad company proceeded 
to barricade and close the street at that point and to enlarge 
its installation at that intersection. It is to be noted that 
at no time did the railroad company petition the Public 
Service Commission of Utah for an order in this matter. 
In the spring of 1945 the Provo City Commission began 
removing these barricades on 9th South Street. The rail-
road company secured a restraining order in the Federal 
District Court of the State of Utah, and that Court, after 
hearing the matter, issued a permanent injunction against 
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the city's removal of the barricades. The city appealed 
from this decision to the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Tenth Circuit, and that Court, in the cases of Pro-
vo City, et al. v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R. Co., 
et al., 156 Fed. 2d 710, reversed the District Court and 
remanded the case with directions to dismiss the action 
with prejudice. The United States Supreme Court denied 
certiorari in the same cases, 329 US 764, 91 L. Ed. 658, 67 
S.Ct. 124. 
Thereafter in January of 1947, the City demanded of 
the railroad company that it remove the barricade and 
place the street in condition for travel. The railroad com-
pany then for the first time petitioned the Public Service , 
Commission of Utah for an "order that public convenience 
and necessity does not demand the establishment, creation, 
or construction of a CfOSsing over applicant's railroad tracks 
along the line of 9th South Street in Provo Utah." The 
City answered, denying . jurisdiction of the Public·.· Service 
Commission, and alleging that the matter was res judicata. 
Nevertheless, the Commission assumed jurisdiction, held 
its hearing, and gave its order as prayed for by the railroad 
company. Subsequently, on March 1, 1949, the City Com~ 
mission instructed the commissioner of streets to tear down 
the barricades and proceed to make 9th South Street pass-
able for public travel. Notice of this action was given to 
the railroad company. The company again filed its appli-' 
cation with the Public Service Commission, praying "for 
an order that public convenience and necessity does not 
demand the establishment, creation or construction of a 
crossing over applicant's railroad ·tracks along the line of 
9th South Street in Provo City, Utah." The City appeared 
at the hearing specially on the 22nd· of April, 1949, and 
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moved that the application of the railroad company be dis-
missed on the grounds: (1) that the Public Service Com-
mission had no jurisdiction; (2) that there was no applica-
tion before the Public Service Commission of Utah for the 
establishment, creation, or construction of a crossing over 
the railroad company's tracks along the line of 9th South 
Street in Provo City, Utah; (3) that the railroad company 
had unlawfully and illegally barricaded and closed that 
street; ( 4) that the street was and still is a public thor-
oughfare, and that the railroa dcompany by its petition was 
seeking to have the commission close that street; and (5) 
that the entire matter was res judicata under the decision 
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit, referred to above . 
. The Public Service Commission of Utah denied this mo-
tion and set the matter for hearing on the merits Septem-
ber 30, 1949. Provo City now brings the matter here on an 
alternative writ of prohibition from this Honorable Court 
to the Public Service Commission of Utah, restraining it 
from hearing the matter, and asks that this writ be made 
permanent . 
. It is the City's position first, that because 9th South 
Street has never been legally closed, the Public Service 
Commission is without jurisdiction to hear an application 
of this nature; second, that the Commission has no juris-
diction to order the closing of a public street within the 
limits of an incorporated city; and, third, that if 76-4-15, 
Utah. Code Annotated, 1943, were construed to grant the 
Commission that power, it would render that portion of the 
statute unconstitutional. 
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I. 
THE APPI.JCATION BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
COMMISSION IS A SUBTERFUGE TO AVOID THE 
ISSUE OF JURISDICTION OF THAT COMMISSION 
TO ORDER THE CLOSING OF A CITY STREET 
WHERE RAILROAD TRACKS CROSS IT. IT 
AVOIDS THE REAL ISSUE BY ASSUMING THE 
RESULTS. 
The railroad company is before the Public Service Com-
mission on the theory that the right-of-way of .9th South 
Street at the pqint where the railroad company's tracks 
cross it no longer exists, and the fee simple has reverted to 
the railroad company. It is on this theory that--it applies 
to the Public Service Commissi~n "for an order that pub-
lic convenience and necessity does not demand . the estab-
lishment, creation, or construction of a. crossing over appli-
cant's railroad tracks along the line of Ninth South. Street 
in Provo, Utah." 
Ninth South Street is physically barricaded at the point 
where the railroad company's tracks cross it. However, 
it is the City's position that the right-of-way for the street 
where those tracks cross it has ·existed for over seventy 
years, still exists, and-that the barricading thereof is wrong-
ful, without lawful authority whatsoever. 
Moreover, we submit that this· question is res judicata. 
The question· of the legai status of that· right-of-way was 
determined in the cases of Provo City et al v. Denver & 
Rio Grande Western R. Co. et al, supra, when the United 
States Court of Appeals· for· the: Tenth Circuit reversed the 
order of the District Court for Utah enjoining the City from 
removing the barricades and making the street passable, 
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and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. 
It is elemental law that where a case is once decided 
by a court, the matter is res judicata as to those facts, and 
the issue cannot be again raised thereon before another tri-
bunal. The question, therefore, as to the existence of a 
street right-of-way at the point of intersection of the rail-
road company's tracka and 9th South Street cannot be 
properly before the Commission. That right-of-way has 
been judicially confirmed. 
This important fact the railroad company convenient-
ly ignores, and the Public Service Commission has shown 
itself willing to go along with the company. Having wrong-
fully barricaded a public street, the railroad company relies 
on that wrong to seek an order of the Public Service Com-
mission to perpetuate it, and the Commission entertains 
the application! We submit that the Public Service Com-
mission is lending its office to aid the railroad company in 
profiting by its own wrongdoing. 
It may be argued that the particular theory on which 
the· railroad company is before the Public Service Commis-
sion is immaterial, so long as it is clear that the Commission 
is acting under the grant of authority in 76-4-15, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, and has the problem of a railroad-street 
crossing before it for determination. This argument is spe-
cious for two reasons. 
First, by entertaining this application the Public Ser-
vice Commission places upon the City the burden of show-
ing a need for a change in the legal status of the crossing. 
This is error, as the present legal status of the crossing, as 
indicated above, is already legally determined, and the bur-
den of showing the necessity for a change should rest on 
the railroad company. 
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The second objection is more serious. By accepting 
the railroad company's theory that the issue is whether or 
not public convenience and necessity require the opening 
of 9th South Street at the point of crossing, the Public 
Service Commission has assisted the railroad company in 
accomplishing a piece of legerdemain whereby the jurisdi-
tional question is changed from the power of the Commis-
sion to order the closing of a city street over a railroad line 
to the power of the Public Service Commission to decide 
whether or not a proposed crossing shall be opened over a 
railroad line. The importance of this distinction on the 
jurisdictional question we shall point out hereafter. 
Suffice it to say, the City's position is this: 9th South 
Street exists in point of law where the railroad company's 
tracks cross it; the railroad company is in fact seeking an 
order, the effect of which would be to close the street right-
of-way across those tracks; and the Public Service Com-
mission is without power to order the closing of a city 
street where railroad tracks cross it. 
One other matter bears consideration here. The very 
fact that the railroad company now places its application 
with the Public Service Commission, after engaging in pro-
tracted litigation through the federal courts, shows the 
transparency of the present subterfuge. Had the railroad 
company believed that the Public Service Commission had 
jurisdiction to close the 9th South Street crossing, why did 
it not petition that body initially? Indeed, the matter of 
jurisdiction of the Public Service Commission was argued 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals, the railroad company taking 
the position that the Public Service Commission had power 
only to determine and prescribe the manner, including the 
point of crossing and terms of installation, of a railroad over 
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a public street, and citing as authority therefor the case of 
Ulnion Pacific R. Co. et al v. Public Service Commission, 103 
Utah 186, 134 P. 2d 469. Having lost its cause in the form 
of its first choice, it seeks the aid of a second, and that sec-
ond is willing to entertain the cause! 
II. 
THE PUBIJIC UTILITIES ACT DOES NOT GIVE THE 
RUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION JURISDICTION 
TO ORDER THE CLOSING OF A PUBLIC STREET 
WITHIN A MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
We recognize the fact that a municipal corporation de-
rives its powers from legislative grant, and that any power 
so granted may be removed by the legislature. However, 
it is our position that the legislature has given power to 
open, establish, or close streets within cities to those cities 
by Section 15-8-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which pro-
vides as follows: 
"They.(cities) may lay out, establish, open, alter, 
widen, narrow, extend, grade, pave or otherwise im-
prove streets alleys, avenues, boulevards, sidewalks, 
parks, airports, and public grounds, and may vacate 
the same or parts thereof by o;rdinance." (Emphasis 
ours). 
It is further our position that this section was _not repealed 
or altered by 76-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
The Public Service Commission is presumably proceed-
ing on the theory that 76-4-15 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 
1943, gives that commission exclusive power to abolish any 
crossing. A reading of that statute will disclose that it only 
gives the Public Service Commission exclusive power to de-
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termine and prescribe the manner, including the point of 
crossing and terms of installation, of a railroad over a pub-
lic street. The statute is thus construed in Union Pacific 
R. Co., et al. v. Public Service Commission, supra, which 
holds that the power granted to cities by 15-8-8, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943, prior to the Public Utilities Act, was not 
repealed by implication thereby. 
An analysis of the Public Utilities Act as passed by 
the legislature in Chapter 47, Laws of Utah, 1917, will in-
dicate the intention of the legislature in this particular sec-
tion. The title of the act is quoted herewith: 
"An Act Creating a Public Utilities Commission, 
Defining Public Utilities, Prescribing the Powers and 
Duties of the Commission and Duties of Public Utili-
ties, Providing Penalties for Violations of Provisions 
of the Act, Appropriating etc." 
The Act is divided into five articles: Article I is entitled 
"Creation of the Commission"; Article II, "Definitions"; 
Article ill, "Duties of Public Utilities"; Article IV, "Au-
thority of Commission over Public Utilities"; and Article V, 
"Procedure." 
76-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, was, in its original 
form, Section 14 of Article IV of the Act. The title of that 
Article is "Authority of Commission over Public Utilities." 
(emphasis added). Section 14 thereof is entitled "Grade 
Crossings-Regulations." From the title of the Act and of 
Article IV, there is dear intent to give the Public Service 
Commission control and jurisdiction over public utilities, 
including railroads; there is absolutely nothing to indicate 
an intent on the -part of the legislature to give the Public 
Service Commission the jurisdiction and power to vacate 
a city street, or otherwise regulate the use of a city street 
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by the city. To accomplish the purposes of the Act, it is 
indispensable that the Commission have jurisdiction over 
railroad lines, including their crossing of each other and of 
streets and highways. It is not indispensable, or even nec-
essary, to accomplish the purposes of the Act, that the Com-
mission have jurisdiction over a street sufficient to order its 
vacation where a railroad track crosses it. 
The question of conflicting jurisdiction between such 
a tribunal and a city arose in the case of City of Chicago 
v. Hastings Express Co. et al., 17 NE 2d 576, 369 Ill. 610. 
In that case the defendants were found guilty of violation 
of a ·"wheel tax" ordinance whereby a tax was placed on 
vehicles operating in the plaintiff city. The defendants ap-
pealed on the theory that they were a public utility and 
were therefore under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Com-
merce Commission by virtue of the illinois Public Utilities 
Act. The Illinois Supreme Court held that the city had the 
power to enact such an ordinance, and in treating of the 
question of jurisdiction of the Commerce Commission, the 
Court stated that the line of demarcation between matters 
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commerce Com-
mission and matters subject to the control by municipali-
ties iies between matters which are an intimate part of and 
of the closest connection with the public utilities service and 
transportation itself, which matters are within the Com-
merce Commission's jurisdiction, and matters which in no 
wise interfere with or overlap such control by the Com-
merce Commission, which matters are subject to municipal 
control. 
We respectfully submit that, while the crossing of one 
utility by another, or the crossing by a utility of a street 
is of the closest connection and an intimate part of the pub-
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lie utility service and transportation itself; the fact that a 
street crosses a utility line is not. Perhaps the Public Ser-
vice Commission may regulate or forbid a licensed common 
carrier under its jurisdiction to use a public street where 
it crosses a railroad line. This may be an intimate part of 
and of the closest connection with the public utility service 
and transportation itself. But the regulation and prohibi-
tion of general public use of such a crossing is not, and the 
Utah legislature never intended that it be thus. 
m. 
A CONSTRUCfiON OF 76-4-15, UTAH CODE ANNOTA-
TED, 1943, GIVING POWER TO THE PUBLIC SER-
VICE COMMISSION TO ORDER THE CLOSING OF 
A CITY STREET WOULD RENDER THAT POR-
TION OF THE STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
If 76-4-15, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, were to be con-
strued as a grant of power to the Commission to close a 
city street where a railroad line crosses it, then it is the 
City's position that that portion-of the statute would be in-
valid. Article VI, Section 29, Utah Constitution, provides: 
"The Legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, any 
power to make, supervise or interfere with any munici-
pal improvement, money, property or effects, whether 
held in trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, to select a 
capitol site, ar to perform any municipal function." 
This Court held in the case of Logan City v. Public Utili-
ties Commission, 72 Utah 536, 271 Pac. 961, that the pur-
pose of this section was to preserve broad powers in mat.., 
ters of self-government to municipalities, and hence, if the 
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delegation of powers mentioned in this section is forbidden 
to "special commissions," it would most certainly apply also 
to a body such as the Public Service Commission. 
This Court further touched on Article VI, Section 29, 
Utah Constitution, in the case of Union Pacific R. Co., et al, 
v. Public Service Commission, supra, saying: 
"That section of the Constitution, together with 
section 10[8], of Article XII thereof, above referred 
to, however, is indicative of an intent on the part of 
the framers of the Constitution to secure to cities and 
towns a large degree of self-government." 
The question of the power of the Commission to order 
or forbid the construction of a street crossing over a rail-
road line is not before this Court (See Argument I above) 
and the City is not here assailing that power. The City's 
thesis is that where the public street exists, with a railroad 
crossing thereon, and the City has not vacated that portion 
of the street according to legislative grant of power, the 
Commission has no power to effect that vacation, and an 
attempt to grant that power would contravene Article VI, 
Section 29, of the Constitution. We take the position that 
a city street such as 9th South Street is a municipal im-
provement and property, and vacating of a street is a muni-
cipal function within that provision. Moreover, it has been 
held that such a street is held by the city in trust for the 
use of the public. Keyser v. City of Boise, 165 Pac. 1121, 
30 Idaho 440. 
The Supreme Court of California, in the case of City of 
San Jose v. Lynch, 52 P. 2d 919, 4 Cal. 2d 760, held that 
the opening, laying out, and improving streets and regulat-
ing their use are "municipal affairs." See also City of Los 
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Angeles v. Central Trust Co. of N. Y., 159 Pac. 1169, 1171, 
173 Cal 323. It is true that California cities exist under 
constitutional "home rule" charters, whereas the charter of 
mtmicipal corporations in Utah is found in acts of the legis-
lature, but this does not affect the authority of those cases 
for the fact that the creation, regulation, and vacating of 
city streets are municipal functions as that phrase is used 
in Article VI, Section 29, of the Utah Constitution. If 76-
4-15 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, were construed to 
grant power to the Public Service Commission to vacate a 
city street where a railroad track crossed it, then ttmt stat-
ute would contravene that constitutional provision. 
That section so construed would then be unconstitu-
tional in another respect; it would constitute an invalid dele-
gation of legislative power. The rule against legislative 
delegation of legislative power, with the exception in cases 
of municipal corporations, is so well established that it re-
quires no re-statement. I McQuillin, Municipal Corpora-
tions, 2d Ed., p. 1102, Sec. 395. The power to lay out, open, 
vacate, or abandon highways and streets is a legislative 
power, which must be exercised by the legislature itself, or 
by the municipal corporations to which the power has been 
delegated, and this rule applies to the legislature itself, pro-
hibiting it from alienating or surrendering this right and 
duty. State ex rei. Townsend v. Board of Park Commis-
sioners, 110 NW 1121, 100 Minn. 150. 
The Arizona Supreme Court, in the case of Menderson 
v. City of Phoenix, 76 P. 2d 321, 51 Ariz. 280, involving 
power of such a commission over a utility owned by a muni-
cipal corporation, stated the rule thus: 
"It is true that the Legislature has very broad 
powers over municipal corporations, but under the well-
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known rule these powers of regulation may not be dele-
gated by the Legislature to any other body, but must 
be exercised by the Degislature itself in terms which 
are not reasonably susceptible of any other interpre-
tation." 
CONCLUSION 
Your petitioner respectfully submits to this Honorable 
Court that the Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad 
Company is enlisting, through subterfuge, the assistance of 
the Public Service Commission to close ,an existing city 
street in the petitioner city, and that the Public Service 
Commission, by hearing the railroad company's application, 
is lending that assistance sought; that the legislature did 
not, in the Public Utilities Act, give power to the Public 
Service Commission to order the closing of a city street 
where railroad tracks cross it; and that such a construction 
of the Public Utilities Act, giving that power to the Public 
Service "Commission, would render that statute unconsti-
tutional as violative of Article VI, Section 29, Utah Consti-
tution. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALLAS H. YOUNG, SR. 
I. E. BROCKBANK 
Attorneys for Petitioner. 
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